Strengthening Charity Law: Replacing Media Oversight with Advance Rulings for Nonprofit Fiduciaries by Sugin, Linda
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2015
Strengthening Charity Law: Replacing Media
Oversight with Advance Rulings for Nonprofit
Fiduciaries
Linda Sugin
Fordham University School of Law, lsugin@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Companies Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Linda Sugin, Strengthening Charity Law: Replacing Media Oversight with Advance Rulings for Nonprofit Fiduciaries, 89 Tul. L. Rev. 869
(2015)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/550
869 
Strengthening Charity Law: 
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Rulings for Nonprofit Fiduciaries 
Linda Sugin* 
This Article considers three urgent challenges facing the charitable community and its 
state regulators:  too little fiduciary duty law for nonprofits, the rise of media enforcement of 
wrongdoing in charities, and an inherent tension in the state’s dual role as enforcer and protector 
of the nonprofit sector.  It analyzes whether the scarcity of law is really a problem by comparing 
nonprofit organizations with business organizations and concludes that charities lack the self-
enforcement mechanisms of businesses and therefore need more government guidance.  It 
evaluates whether the media has made governmental supervision obsolete and expresses 
skepticism about the press displacing state oversight.  The solution presented, an advance-ruling 
procedure for fiduciary duty questions, proposes that states shift their focus from better 
enforcement against wrongdoers ex post to better charity governance ex ante by devoting more 
attention and resources to assisting well-meaning charity directors in carrying out their fiduciary 
obligations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Imagine you are on the board of trustees1 of a charity.  The 
executive director reports that the organization is in terrible financial 
trouble.  She presents several options:  sell off long-held assets owned 
by the organization and use the proceeds to make ends meet; 
drastically reduce services and programming that the organization 
provides; borrow money and increase the organization’s ongoing 
obligations and risk; or merge with another, larger organization that 
will ultimately obliterate the unique character of the charity.  All seem 
undesirable to you, and you do not know if you are obligated to choose 
any particular one.  Alternatively, consider your response if the 
executive director reports positive results for the organization’s 
operations and proposes a massive expansion of the organization’s 
activities and scope that will fundamentally change the nature of the 
charity’s services and operations.  You are nervous about the 
organization taking on new risks and are concerned about its 
relationship with current beneficiaries and the community.  But it is 
not clear to you whether the risk is responsible or whether you are in a 
position to protect current beneficiaries and the community (or if you 
should).  Finally, imagine instead that the executive director’s proposal 
involves business dealings between the organization and another 
member of the board or a relative of the executive director.  Something 
may not smell right to you about the proposal, but if the price seems 
fair, you may not be able to put your finger on what it is. 
 These issues are common for nonprofit fiduciaries, but solving 
them requires nuance and judgment.  If you are like most people who 
volunteer to serve on charity boards, you want to do the right thing for 
the organization and the community.  You volunteered because you 
believe in the charity’s mission and want to support it.2  But there is a 
good chance that you do not know the right thing to do under the law.  
The legal obligations of charity boards are not widely known or easy to 
discover, and state attorneys general (AG)—who are responsible for 
the oversight of charities—have numerous other responsibilities 
demanding their time and resources.  So the people who run charities 
often muddle along, doing their best, without much legal guidance. 
                                                 
 1. This Article will refer to “trustees” and “directors” interchangeably.  They are the 
people on the governing board of a charity, whatever its form.  Charities can have various 
state law forms, including both trusts and corporations. 
 2. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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 Those who think of the nonprofits as superfluous—a bonus on 
top of the essential government and business sectors—may be satisfied 
with mediocrity in the nonprofit world.  But they should not be.  
Nonprofits play a crucial role in the economic, social, and cultural life 
of society.3  Well-functioning charities are needed to provide a broad 
array of public and private goods, including social services, higher 
education, and the arts.  Nonprofits address important public needs, 
even though they are privately managed.  States have an interest in the 
effective operation of charities because the better charities are run, the 
more they can contribute to their public missions and overall social 
welfare.4  States have an interest in good charity governance because 
they have an interest in good charitable services.  Unlike business 
organizations, which bring tax revenue and economic spillover into a 
state,5 a state’s charities bring a higher quality of life to the people of 
the state. 
 This Article considers three urgent challenges facing the 
nonprofit community and its state regulators:  too little fiduciary duty 
law for nonprofits, the rise of media enforcement of wrongdoing in 
charities, and the inherent tension in the state’s dual role of enforcer 
and protector in the nonprofit sector—what I call the “confidentiality 
paradox.”  First, there are surprisingly few cases concerning fiduciary 
obligations of nonprofit directors.6  Scholars who would adopt 
                                                 
 3. In 2010, public charities reported $1.51 trillion in revenue and $2.71 trillion in 
assets.  See Amy S. Blackwood, Katie L. Roeger & Sarah L. Pettijohn, The Nonprofit Sector 
in Brief:  Public Charities, Giving, and Volunteering, 2012, URBAN INST. 1 (2012), 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-In-Brief.pdf.  Nonprofits 
paid 9.2% of all wages and salaries in 2010.  See Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NAT’L 
CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STAT., http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2015). 
 4. In order to qualify for tax exemption, charities must be “organized and operated 
exclusively” for public purposes defined in the statute.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 5. Delaware has attracted a disproportionate share of business organizations, which 
produce substantial franchise tax revenue for the small state.  There is no similar competition 
among states for charities.  See Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the 
Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1161-62 (2007). 
 6. My research revealed only the following published cases finding breaches and 
applying remedies:  Boston Children’s Heart Foundation, Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d 429 
(1st Cir. 1996); Lifespan Corp. v. New England Medical Center, Inc., No. 06-cv-421-JNL, 
2011 WL 2134286 (D.R.I. May 24, 2011); Aramony v. United Way of America, 28 F. Supp. 
2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for 
Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974); Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 
N.E.2d 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Shepard of the Valley Lutheran Church of Hastings v. Hope 
Lutheran Church of Hastings, 626 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); State ex rel. Little 
People’s Child Development Center, Inc. v. Little People’s Child Development Center, Inc., 
No. M2007-00345-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 103509 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009); Summers v. 
Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Marist 
 
 
 
 
872 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:869 
 
business law principles into the law of nonprofit organizations fail to 
see a problem of too little law because they would borrow from 
business law precedent.7  But in the context of fiduciary duties, 
business law is woefully inapt for nonprofits.8 
 Second, the proliferation of charity-rating and monitoring 
institutions9 has altered the landscape from legal to nonlegal oversight 
for charities.  Private watchdogs, along with the media, have become 
the most important enforcers of charity fiduciary behavior.  In some 
cases, the media leads while the state authorities follow with 
enforcement action, but sometimes, media enforcement supplants 
governmental oversight altogether.10  For individuals involved in 
charity misdeeds, media enforcement is a shaming remedy.  Shaming 
may be effective in controlling the behavior of some fiduciaries, but 
we should be skeptical about its equity and efficiency.  The media may 
get the standards wrong, may sensationalize stories to grab attention, 
and may yield net negative effects on the charitable sector and society 
as a whole.11  The privatization of legal standards threatens the states’ 
control over the definitions of good charity governance and 
wrongdoing, and it is imperative that states reassert their crucial role. 
 Third, a confidentiality paradox exists because there is a tension 
inherent in the charities enforcement work of the AG between 
effectiveness in a particular case and usefulness to the charitable sector 
as a whole.  Confidentiality is good for a charity under investigation, 
but bad for others who would learn from its mistakes.  Unlike the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which regulates charities in the course 
of policing their tax exemptions, state AGs are protectors of the 
                                                                                                             
College v. Nicklin, No. 01-94-00849-CV, 1995 WL 241710 (Tex. App. Apr. 27, 1995); and 
John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). 
 7. I have previously written about why business law fails to suit the policies of 
charity law.  See Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance:  
Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893 (2007). 
 8. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 9. See, e.g., BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE, http://give.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); 
CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www.charitynavigator.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); CHARITY 
WATCH, http://www.charitywatch.org/home (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); GiveWell Blog, 
GIVEWELL, http://blog.givewell.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); Watchdog, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV., http://www.ssireview.org/blog/category/watchdog (last visited Mar. 1, 
2015). 
 10. See, e.g., Kathleen Teltsch, United Way Awaits Inquiry on Its President’s 
Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/24/us/united-way-
awaits-inquiry-on-its-president-s-practices.html (stating that William Aramony’s behavior had 
been uncovered in “several publications”). 
 11. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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charitable sector.12  The state’s role is as parens patriae,13 so its object in 
overseeing charities is to protect the public good.14  Effectiveness in AG 
enforcement implies preservation of charitable assets.  These goals 
often counsel secrecy and settlement by the state with a charity under 
investigation without legal enforcement proceedings.  Where the AG 
can reform a charity and improve its governance by demanding 
internal changes in structure, process, or policies, confidentiality is 
desirable so that the charity suffers no loss of donors or public 
embarrassment.  Except in the rare situation in which a charity is 
fraudulent at its core,15 or there is no public benefit that it provides, a 
targeted remedy that corrects a problem is best for minimizing damage 
to a particular charity’s mission and perhaps to the reputation of the 
charitable sector as a whole.  Unfortunately, secrecy and unpublished 
settlement are prime causes of the lack of law.  If participants in the 
charitable sector—particularly lawyers—had greater knowledge of 
both the issues raised in AG investigations and the solutions designed 
with the input of the state, they would be in a better position to advise 
nonprofit boards on how to behave. 
 Improving charity governance requires balancing diverse 
concerns for individual organizations, the charitable sector, and the 
public at large.  Even with scarce resources, states need to create more 
law for nonprofits, so innovation in lawmaking is essential.  This 
Article proposes that states shift their focus from better enforcement 
against wrongdoers ex post to better governance ex ante16 by devoting 
                                                 
 12. See Karen Gano, The Fundamental Role of the States in Governance Issues, 
COLUM. U. ACAD. COMMONS 1, 3 n.4 (2013), academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ 
ac%3A168598. 
 13. Latin for “parent of the nation,” which in the legal context refers to the state 
having standing to sue on behalf of its citizens.  See id. at 1 (“The Attorney General’s duty 
arises from the responsibility of the parens patriae as representative of the indefinite members 
of the public—the public at large—who are the beneficiaries of property devoted to 
charitable purposes.” (emphasis added)). 
 14. A visit to any state AG’s website describes their role as protecting the “public 
good.”  See, e.g., N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.ag.ny.gov (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); 
Protecting Consumers, ILL. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/ 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 15. See, e.g., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $500k Settlement and the Shuttering of 
Three Long Island Sham Charities and Their Professional Fundraiser, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. (Feb. 
4, 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-500k-settlement-
and-shuttering-three-long-island-sham (“[T]he charities were shell organizations run 
primarily for the benefit of the fundraiser and the charities’ officers, and that less than 4 
percent of the money raised went to any charitable purpose.”). 
 16. This is consistent with the approach of the Leadership Committee for Nonprofit 
Revitalization.  Leadership Committee for Nonprofit Revitalization, Report to Attorney 
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more attention (and resources) to assisting well-meaning charity 
directors in carrying out their fiduciary obligations. 
 The next section, Part II, describes the minimal legal enforcement 
of fiduciary obligations in nonprofit organizations.  It analyzes 
whether the scarcity of law is really a problem by comparing nonprofit 
organizations with business organizations.  Part III considers the 
media’s role in oversight of nonprofit governance and explains how the 
importance of reputation in the charities world has allowed the media 
to effectively displace legal authorities.  It evaluates whether the media 
has made governmental oversight obsolete and expresses skepticism 
about the press displacing state enforcement.  Part IV suggests a 
solution to the identified challenges by advocating an AG-based 
advance-ruling process for fiduciary duty questions, modeled on the 
private letter ruling procedure administered by the IRS.  It argues that 
such a process would be an equitable and efficient alternative to media 
enforcement, would create a body of useful legal advice, and would be 
preferable to other suggestions in the literature for addressing the 
problem of inadequate charitable fiduciary oversight.  Part V briefly 
concludes. 
II. WHERE IS THE LAW IN NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE? 
A. What Is Charity Law? 
 Charity law consists of both federal law and state law.  
Organizations are subject to substantial regulation in the federal tax 
law in order to be eligible for exemption.  Only organizations 
qualifying as charities may receive tax-deductible contributions from 
donors,17 so they are the gold standard for tax-exempt institutions.  The 
IRS provides that charities may not pay profits out to individuals (the 
“inurement” prohibition), must be organized and operated for a 
statutorily-enumerated purpose, and are restricted in their political 
activities.18  Much of the federal law applies to activities by 
organizations, but such regulation necessarily implicates the behavior 
of the individuals who control them.  As the tax enforcer, the IRS is 
responsible for policing the boundaries of charitable organizations. 
                                                                                                             
General Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. 23-34 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ag.ny.gov/ 
sites/default/files/NP%20Leadership%20Committee%20Report%20%282-16-12%29.pdf. 
 17. I.R.C. § 170 (2012). 
 18. Id. § 501(c)(3).  There are organizations that are exempt from tax, but are not 
charities.  See id. § 501(c). 
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 State law directly regulates the behavior of nonprofit directors, 
imposing fiduciary duties on individuals who are in control of 
charitable organizations.19  While the precise terms of law differ across 
states, all states mandate that charity directors exercise care in their 
decision making20 and elevate the interests of the charity over their 
personal interests, if they ever conflict.21  In addition, individuals in 
charge of charities have an obligation to carry out a charitable 
mission.22  These fiduciary concepts are vague, and governing 
charitable organizations is not easy.23  Not only has the number of 
organizations grown in recent years,24 but the complexity of their 
structures and operations has increased as well.25 
 States do not dictate “how to ‘do’ charity,”26 but state AGs oversee 
charity behavior; they are responsible for enforcing the obligations of 
loyalty, care, and obedience that fiduciaries have under the laws of 
                                                 
 19. See Jenkins, supra note 5, at 1126-27; see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 
§ 717(a) (2014) (imposing fiduciary duties on leaders of charitable organizations). 
 20. New York law provides a succinct definition for care:  “Directors and officers 
shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with the care an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.”  
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a).  To satisfy the obligation, “trustees must 
affirmatively exercise discretion and make a deliberate judgment.”  J. Edward Meyer et al., 
Report to the New York Board of Regents on Adelphi University Trustees, IND. UNIV.-PURDUE 
UNIV. INDIANAPOLIS 16 (Feb. 5, 1997), https://folio.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/502/ 
THE%20COMMITTEE%20TO%20SAVE%20ADELPHI.pdf?sequence=1. 
 21. See DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY:  GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 59 
(1988) (“The basic duty of loyalty . . . requires a director to have an undivided allegiance to 
the organization’s mission . . . when using either the power of his position or information he 
possesses concerning the organization or its property.”).  The famous quote in the corporate 
context, equally applicable to nonprofits, is Judge Cardozo’s description of the duty as “[n]ot 
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 
N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).  The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act requires that directors act 
“in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the nonprofit 
corporation.”  MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (2008). 
 22. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:  
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 428 (2004).  While some scholars dispute the 
separate obligation of obedience, I have previously argued for it.  See Sugin, supra note 7. 
 23. See Evelyn Brody, The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations, in THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR:  A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 243, 244 (Walter W. Powell & Richard 
Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“[I]t is not easy to say what ‘the law’ is in the nonprofit sector.”). 
 24. The number of public charities registered with the IRS increased 42% from 2000 
through 2010, to almost a million organizations.  Blackwood, Roeger & Pettijohn, supra note 
3, at 2.  In 2010, the entire nonprofit sector—which includes private and public charities, 
small organizations not required to register, religious organizations, and other noncharitable 
nonprofits—exceeded 2.3 million organizations.  See id. at 1-2, 4. 
 25. See John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 489 (2002) (“[I]t is now common to find charities engaged in 
numerous economic activities through a variety of business arrangements including 
subsidiary corporations, joint ventures, and contractual agreements.”). 
 26. Brody, supra note 23, at 243. 
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every state.27  The AG’s burden is great because very few other parties 
are allowed to bring suit to enforce these duties.28  AG charities offices 
are underfunded and understaffed, and they have not grown at the rate 
of the sector itself.29  Consequently, deliberate malfeasance by charity 
insiders can often proceed undetected by AGs.  At the same time, well-
meaning directors receive little guidance and assistance from the AGs 
in carrying out their obligations.  Honest trustees often lack the 
knowledge and judgment necessary to carry out their legal obligations 
of careful attention30 and fidelity31 to the organizations that they serve.  
In many states, there is virtually no easily accessible information to 
guide fiduciaries in their roles.32  To confuse things further for charity 
directors and state regulators, the IRS has encroached on the states’ 
traditional role in overseeing nonprofit governance, even though it may 
not have the legal authority to preempt the states’ traditional functions 
and despite its questionable suitability for the task.33 
B. Legal Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties Is Minimal 
 The lack of law stems from both the dearth of decided cases that 
specifically involve charities and the scarcity of specific rules and 
standards applicable to charities in many states.  Some states have no 
unique charity law at all, creating the impression either that charities 
are somehow beyond the law or that there is nothing unique about the 
law of charities compared to the law of other institutions.34  While the 
                                                 
 27. See Gano, supra note 12, at 1, 14-15. 
 28. In addition to the AG, directors have standing to bring suit for violations of 
fiduciary duties, but beneficiaries and donors generally do not.  See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled 
Standing:  Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries? 23 J. CORP. L. 
655 (1998).  Many fiduciary duty cases are dismissed for lack of standing.  See infra note 46 
and accompanying text. 
 29. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 22, at 445. 
 30. See id. at 199-205 (defining the duty of care as including paying attention to the 
corporation’s affairs). 
 31. See Sugin, supra note 7, at 902 (describing the duty of obedience as a “more 
abstract fiduciary duty” of fidelity). 
 32. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 33. See James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption:  The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545 (2010); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. 
Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century:  An Institutional Choice Analysis, 
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479 (2010); Marcus S. Owens, Charities and Governance:  Is the IRS 
Subject to Challenge?, 60 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 287 (2008), available at http://www. 
lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/ (select “Advanced Options”; type “Tax Analysts 
Exempt Organization Tax Review Magazine” into the “Source” section; then search for 
“Charities and Governance:  Is the IRS Subject to Challenge”). 
 34. Sophisticated lawyers would advise New York charities to incorporate in 
Delaware because it has no separate law.  See Jenkins, supra note 5. 
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law of charities overlaps with the law of trusts and the law of business 
corporations, there are unique characteristics of charitable 
organizations that demand specific law.  Those characteristics were 
apparent to the drafters of the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, and the 
increasing complexity of charities’ structures and operations today 
makes legal rules even more important now. 
 Published opinions concerning the fiduciary duties of individuals 
who control nonprofit organizations are few, and cases holding 
directors liable for breach are scarce.  While directors have obligations 
of loyalty, care, and (maybe) obedience,35 states enforcing fiduciary 
duties concentrate on the duty of loyalty, which demands that 
fiduciaries refrain from using their positions to improperly obtain 
personal benefits.36  The emphasis on loyalty is not surprising given 
that violations of loyalty are the clearest example of charity abuse.  
Courts have found the duty breached when there is clear self-dealing 
by the director that enriches the director at the expense of the charity.37  
In some cases, large monetary penalties have been imposed on the 
breaching parties and awarded to the organization.38  These penalties 
punish the wrongdoer, make the organization whole, and serve as a 
warning to future directors not to engage in self-dealing. 
 Occasionally, an organization may be dissolved for self-dealing.39  
Though a dramatic remedy, dissolution may be desirable where there is 
no public purpose or charitable activities to be preserved by keeping 
the organization alive.  In the most egregious fraud cases, individuals 
may create an organization for nothing but self-enrichment, so the 
purpose of the organization is not really charitable at all, but exists 
                                                 
 35. See Sugin, supra note 7, at 896-904 (discussing the duty of obedience as a “the 
stepchild to the duties of care and loyalty within the nonprofit cannon”). 
 36. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES 
AND MATERIALS 163 (4th ed. 2010). 
 37. See Bos. Children’s Heart Found., Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 
1996); State ex rel. Little People’s Child Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Little People’s Child Dev. Ctr., Inc., 
No. M2007-00345-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 103509 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009); Summers v. 
Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Marist 
Coll. v. Nicklin, No. 01-94-00849-CV, 1995 WL 241710 (Tex. App. Apr. 27, 1995); John v. 
John, 450 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). 
 38. See Bos. Children’s, 73 F.3d at 431, 443 (awarding judgments in favor of Boston 
Children’s Heart Foundation for $6,562,283.02); Little People’s, 2009 WL 103509, at *11 
(awarding judgment against defendants for $1,782,666.00); Marist Coll., 1995 WL 241710, 
at *2 (awarding the college a total of $19,825.22, with $8,189.76 coming from the defendant, 
Nicklin, directly); see also John, 450 N.W.2d at 797-98 (enjoining an officer from serving as 
the organization’s director in the future and requiring them to pay a monetary sum of 
$1,171,418.00 plus interest). 
 39. See Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 531. 
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only to siphon funds from the charitable sector into private hands.  The 
Coalition Against Breast Cancer, which managed to raise substantial 
sums from donors, is a good example.  It was “a sham charity that 
ha[d] diverted nearly all of the millions of dollars raised in the name of 
breast cancer to its officers, directors and fundraisers.”40  In its 
complaint, the New York AG demanded the organization’s 
dissolution.41 
 Despite these examples, director liability is unusual, and in cases 
involving breach of care alone, it is exceptional.42  Care is more likely 
to be enforced if it is accompanied by a breach of loyalty than if it 
constitutes gross negligence with inchoate consequences for the 
organization.43  The combination care-loyalty pattern is predictable, 
and the harm from failure to exercise care is more concrete where it is 
an accessory to a loyalty breach—a powerful insider steals from an 
organization (loyalty) and the directors charged with monitoring him 
are not paying attention (care), so the charity’s losses are undetected, 
prolonged, and/or large.  If an organization has any directors who were 
not involved in the self-dealing that occurred, they presumably failed 
in their oversight role.  But it is unusual for the negligent directors, 
who enjoyed no personal financial benefits from the wrongdoing, to 
be personally liable for the losses.  New York’s settlement with 
Educational Housing Services (EHS) and its directors is a recent 
example of this combination:  while the founder siphoned money from 
the organization, the rest of the directors failed to stop him.44  The EHS 
                                                 
 40. Gary Snyder, This Breast Cancer Fraud Has It All, NONPROFIT IMPERATIVE (July 
21, 2011), http://nonprofitimperative.blogspot.com/2011/07/this-breast-cancer-fraud-has-it-
all.html. 
 41. Complaint, State v. Coal. Against Breast Cancer, Inc. (No. 20432-2011), http:// 
www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/2011/Summons%20and%20Complaint.pdf. 
 42. Because care violations are often alleged coincident with loyalty violations, it is 
often hard to differentiate the remedies for each.  Monetary liability for a care violation alone 
is rare, though there are a few cases.  See, e.g., Lifespan Corp. v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., Inc., 
No. 06-cv-421-JNL, 2011 WL 2134286 (D.R.I. May 24, 2011) (awarding a $272,756 
judgment for care violation); Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 
1970); In re Estate of Donner, 626 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1993) (finding a trustee guilty of a care 
violation). 
 43. See Aramony v. United Way of Am., 28 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding 
breaches of both care and loyalty and entering judgments against directors); Stern v. Lucy 
Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 
1974) (same); Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (resolving a suit 
against a nonprofit director on the theory of corporate veil piercing without addressing the 
director’s fiduciary responsibilities of loyalty and care); John, 450 N.W.2d 795 (finding 
breaches of both care and loyalty and entering judgments against directors). 
 44. Assurance of Discontinuance, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. 1-5 (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www. 
ag.ny.gov/pdfs/EHS_AOD.pdf. 
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case is unusual because the negligent directors agreed to pay $850,000 
in damages for their breach of fiduciary duties to the organization, 
even though they had not financially benefitted.45 
 Notwithstanding some enforcement successes at the 
administrative stage or in litigation, individual plaintiffs generally lose 
in charity fiduciary duties actions.  Because AGs are the only party 
with undisputed standing to sue, courts commonly dismiss fiduciary 
breach cases for lack of standing.46  Where plaintiffs are permitted to 
proceed, some courts have concluded that the defendant owed no 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs, based on an analysis of the relationship 
between the parties in the dispute.47  Other cases hold that the directors 
have acted within the appropriate bounds of their fiduciary duties,48 
which are broad because the “best judgment rule” protects nonprofit 
managers from liability for mistakes in judgment if they act in good 
faith, with sufficient care, and without conflicts of interest.49  Even 
where plaintiffs prevail, the remedies for gross negligence may be 
weak:  in a leading care case, the court ordered future trustees of an 
organization to read his opinion explaining why the directors involved 
in the case were grossly negligent in carrying out their obligations.50  
                                                 
 45. See id. at 7. 
 46. See, e.g., Wisdom v. Centerville Fire Dist., Inc., 391 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Askew v. Trs. of the Gen. 
Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 
584 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Koch v. Ironwood Country Club, No. E030460, 2002 WL 1965466 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2002); George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1954); O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398 (Md. 1994); Grand Council of Ohio v. 
Owens, 620 N.E.2d 234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Lundberg v. Lascelles, No. 59178-9-I, 2007 
WL 4157779 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2007). 
 47. The relationship between the parties is analyzed and found to be one not 
requiring fiduciary duties.  See Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008); 
Olson v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., No. B201428, 2009 WL 1039573 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 
2009); Fine Iron Works v. La. World Exposition, Inc., 472 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1985); 
State ex rel. Boone v. Sundquist, 884 S.W.2d 438 (Tenn. 1994). 
 48. See S. Bay Rod & Gun Club v. Dashiell, No. D053658, 2009 WL 4547032 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2009); Murrell v. Crocker, No. B190152, 2007 WL 1839478 (Cal. Ct. App. 
June 28, 2007); In re Northridge Earthquake Commercial Litig. (Farmers Grp.), No. 
B170128, 2004 WL 1832970 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004); White v. Bd. of Dirs. of St. 
Elizabeth Baptist Church, 42,903-CA (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08); 974 So. 2d 164; Consumers 
Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 2005). 
 49. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 36, at 152-53.  The best judgment rule is 
the nonprofit corollary to the business judgment rule in corporate law. 
 50. The order reads: 
 Ordered that each present trustee of Sibley Memorial Hospital and each 
future trustee selected during the next five years shall, within two weeks of this 
Order or promptly after election to the Board, read this Order and the attached 
Memorandum Opinion and shall signify in writing or by notation in the minutes of 
a Board meeting that he or she has done so . . . . 
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While the judge was innovative, as a punishment for wrongdoing, the 
remedy was undeniably pathetic.  At best, enforcement of charity 
fiduciary duties is exceedingly modest, and few cases produce useful 
lessons for fiduciaries to follow. 
C. Can Business Law Fill the Gap in Charities Fiduciary Law? 
 One possible solution to the problem of too little law for 
nonprofit organizations could be to borrow the law from business 
organizations.  It is common for the law of nonprofit organizations to 
look to its for-profit counterpart as a model, and the statutory 
standards for loyalty and care in nonprofit corporations mirror the 
standards for business corporations.51  Businesses and nonprofits share 
the same kinds of agency cost problems—managers of both might be 
tempted to steal from the organization or to shirk their responsibilities.  
Good governance in both contexts depends on keeping greed and sloth 
at bay. 
 But there is not much to borrow.  Fiduciary duties in business 
organizations are hardly enforced by regulators at all.  Since corporate 
shareholders can bring derivative suits against directors, courts have 
had an opportunity to consider more claims for breach of care against 
directors of businesses than against nonprofits.  Nevertheless, in the 
business corporation context—like for nonprofits—the duty of care is 
almost never enforced by a court.52  Some corporate law scholars seem 
to be satisfied with the lack of legal enforcement of care.53  Edward 
Rock and Michael Wachter describe the corporation as “self-
governing” and argue that if courts intervened regularly in questions of 
negligence, centralized management could not function.54  Centralized 
management is necessary in nonprofit organizations as well as in 
business corporations because decisions must be made and 
                                                                                                             
Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 
1003, 1021 (D.D.C. 1974). 
 51. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2007); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (2008). 
 52. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining the business judgment 
rule and rare liability for corporate directors); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) 
(discussing care but not imposing any liability for its breach); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  The most famous case imposing liability for lack of care, 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), led to an upheaval in the legal community 
before the adoption of the liability shield in DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014).  See 
generally Roundtable Discussion:  Corporate Governance, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 235 (2001). 
 53. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:  Law, 
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1699 (2001). 
 54. Id. 
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implemented, so we might conclude, by analogy, that we should leave 
nonprofits alone to self-govern also. 
 Keeping courts out of questions of negligence in nonprofit 
governance would reduce the role of the state.  But given the press’s 
and the public’s interest in nonprofit governance (and scandals), media 
oversight of nonprofit governance would continue regardless of the 
state’s choice.55  The “self-governing” nonprofit organization would be 
subject to internal controls and media scrutiny.  Abstention by the state 
would increase the importance of the media’s role and its method of 
shaming charities leaders into good behavior.  Would that be preferable 
to a larger state role?  David Skeel argues, in the business context, that 
shaming of corporate directors is a particularly good approach to 
enforcing care violations because monetary liability is inappropriate 
where the directors did not personally benefit from their fiduciary 
failures.56  The problem with ill-fitting judicial remedies is common to 
breaches of care in both the for-profit and nonprofit context, so 
shaming might be a better remedy for both.  Skeel notes that there has 
been judicial shaming in the business context by the Delaware courts.57  
In addition to front-page newspaper embarrassment, official shaming 
is an option in the nonprofit sector as well; the AG could publish lists 
of negligent directors and their organizations.58  But an official 
shaming remedy would require the same kind of enforcement costs as 
other official remedies—the state would need to undertake investiga-
tions and prosecutions in getting to that result.  The beauty of a 
shaming regime is that the press can do it without the participation of 
the state so the AG can direct its attention to other issues.59 
 Another alternative to active enforcement modeled on business 
law is increased disclosure.  The most significant recent developments 
in nonprofit law have related to disclosure.60  Disclosure may make 
                                                 
 55. See discussion infra Part III (discussing media shaming in more detail). 
 56. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 
1854 (2001) (discussing the Caremark case). 
 57. Id. at 1855 n.178 (noting that courts have lectured corporate directors in their 
opinions). 
 58. Charities bureaus already do engage in a shaming activity by publishing statistics 
about fund-raisers’ share of money raised on behalf of charities.  See, e.g., “Pennies for 
Charity”—The Attorney General’s Report on Fundraisers in New York, CHARITIESNYS.COM, 
http://www.charitiesnys.com/pennies_report_new.jsp (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).  For better or 
for worse, the media is a more effective purveyor of shame because it gets more readers. 
 59. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance:  Public 
Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183 (2012); Dana Brakman Reiser, There 
Ought To Be a Law:  The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit 
Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559 (2005). 
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organizations more internally self-regulating by relying on both 
reputational incentives and fear of enforcement.  If an organization 
must disclose what it is doing, it is more likely to try to do everything 
right.  It is also more likely that the authorities will discover 
wrongdoing, making it easier for them to enforce appropriate fiduciary 
duties.  Disclosure has long been a feature of the federal law applicable 
to public corporations,61 although the nature and breadth of disclosure 
requirements differ substantially for businesses and charities.62  IRS 
Form 990, the informational return that tax-exempt organizations must 
file with the federal government, was recently revised to increase the 
governance disclosure it requires.63  The form asks organizations to 
explicitly state, for example, whether they have a written conflict-of-
interest policy, whistle-blower policy, and document-retention policy.64  
Although the form states that these are policies not required by the tax 
law,65 anyone completing the form gets the clear message that the 
correct answer to these questions is “yes.”  These filings are provided 
to the government, but it may be more significant that they are readily 
available online,66 so that the public reputation of an organization is at 
stake in these answers.  Some commentators have been skeptical about 
the value of increased disclosure requirements as a self-enforcement 
mechanism for the nonprofit sector, particularly given the costs to the 
sector of disclosure itself.67  The link between disclosure and 
governance improvement may simply be too weak for increased public 
                                                 
 61. Reiser, supra note 60, at 570 n.52.  Companies with more than $10 million in 
assets whose securities are held by more than 500 owners must file reports.  Reports are 
publicly available.  See EDGAR, SEC, http://sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm# (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 62. There are many more 990s filed than 10-K reports, and while the precise content 
of the disclosed information differs, both forms require financial information and governance 
information.  See Form 10-K, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015); Form 990, IRS 6 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.  
Though small charities do not have to file lengthy reports, small and private businesses are 
not subject to the federal requirements.  See Instructions for Form 990-EZ, IRS 1 (Dec. 23, 
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990ez.pdf; Form 10-K, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/form10k.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 63. See 2011 Form 990 and 990-EZ—Significant Changes, IRS (May 18, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2011_form_990_significant_changes.pdf. 
 64. Form 990, supra note 62, at 6. 
 65. Id. 
 66. GUIDESTAR, http://www.guidestar.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 67. See Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About 
Regulation of Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007); Brody, supra note 60; 
Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org:  Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive 
Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2004); Reiser, supra note 60. 
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disclosure to be worth its cost, and it is impossible to know how much 
“self-governance” that disclosure actually produces. 
 Disclosure may be a more desirable solution in the business 
context than in the nonprofit context.  The key factor that makes 
disclosure powerful in business law—and allows courts to reasonably 
stay out of negligence questions—is markets.  Courts do not need to 
enforce the duty of care, not because business corporations are actually 
“self-governing,” but because the market for corporate control 
monitors corporate governance.68  Business directors and executives 
ignore the fiduciary standards of conduct at their peril.  But nonprofit 
directors need not fear a market monitor.  In the charities context, there 
is no parallel market that functions as a market for control because 
nonprofits do not have shareholders who can sell control.69  There are 
no proxy contests or even director elections.  Nonprofit boards are 
self-perpetuating:  current directors recruit their cohorts and 
successors.70 
 The market in which nonprofits operate is a market for charitable 
donations, government contracts, and volunteer services.  It is possible 
that these markets impose some governance constraints; an 
organization that does no good is likely to eventually wither from lack 
of support.  But these markets are not efficient, so they are unlikely to 
be nearly as powerful as the market for control in the business context.  
Henry Hansmann’s explanation for why nonprofits exist—“contract 
failure”—would suggest that donors, beneficiaries, and volunteers 
would be slow to recognize a nonprofit’s failure to carry out its 
mission.71  Lack of information is a crucial component of “contract 
failure,” which Hansmann defines as “the inability to police producers 
by ordinary contractual devices.”72  For example, donors who finance 
charitable services for others cannot be sure that the services are 
actually being provided because they cannot see the services 
themselves.  Hansmann explains that the nonprofit form of 
                                                 
 68. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110, 113 (1965).  This is the classic story anyway, which has been refined, critiqued, 
and tested in the corporate law literature, but is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 69. But see Dana Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Takeovers:  Regulating the Market for 
Mission Control, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1181 (analyzing changes in control and direction of 
nonprofit organizations and comparing them to corporate takeovers). 
 70. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 36, at 127 (stating that organizations 
without members have no constituents that behave like shareholders, so their governing 
boards choose their successors). 
 71. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 
845 (1980). 
 72. Id. 
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organization exists to overcome this problem.73  The nondistribution 
constraint that characterizes nonprofits substitutes for a working 
market:  donors may not be able to confirm that an organization’s 
managers used their money the way the organization promised, but at 
least they know that managers did not put it in their pockets.  None of 
these nonprofit constituencies have as powerful a force at their 
disposal as that of the corporate takeover market.74  Donors can 
withhold their funds, volunteers can withhold their services, and 
governments can withhold their contracts, but with self-perpetuating 
boards, their effect on governance is limited.  So the business 
corporation model of self-enforcement seems ill-suited to nonprofits.  
The duty of care may be enforced by an invisible hand for public 
companies, but it is nonetheless enforced.  To the contrary, fiduciary 
duties of nonprofit organizations either need to be enforced by the 
state or left to the media’s enforcement.  The next Part considers the 
latter option. 
III. MEDIA OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES GOVERNANCE 
A. Media Enforcement Is Robust Because Reputation Matters to 
Nonprofit Leaders 
 Stories of charities abuses have long been popular with 
newspapers,75 and the growth of the internet has allowed more charities 
watchdogs to arise.76  Thus, despite its lack of legal status, the media 
has become a crucial player in the story of charities regulation.  
Underenforcement of fiduciary duties by AGs and courts does not 
mean that nonprofit fiduciaries escape condemnation for their 
wrongdoing.  Instead, individuals who control charities are more likely 
to be censured in the court of public opinion than in a court of law. 
 Individuals who benefit personally at the expense of the 
organizations they serve are prime targets for the press because their 
stories can be quite sensational.  A front-page story in the New York 
Times about Cecilia Chang, a dean at St. John’s University who killed 
herself while being tried for stealing more than a million dollars from 
                                                 
 73. See id. at 859-61. 
 74. Cf. David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions:  Incentives, 
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221 (2009) (arguing for 
greater monitoring of nonprofits by donors). 
 75. The United Way story was uncovered by the Washington Post.  See Harvey J. 
Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers:  Paradoxes, 
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 633 (1998). 
 76. See sources cited supra note 9. 
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the university and its donors, was both bizarre and violent.77  While the 
legal authorities were criminally prosecuting Chang, news stories were 
able to drag in other individuals who may not have been criminally 
culpable.  For example, the Times reported that the university’s 
president, the Reverend Donald Harrington, accepted a Patek Philippe 
watch and custom suits from Chang’s supporters.78  Although a less 
lurid part of the story, the allegations are troubling from the perspective 
of Harrington’s fiduciary duties.  Regardless of whether the state ever 
proceeds against him, the news reports were certainly embarrassing 
and damaging to his reputation.79  By looking at the university’s 
leadership, the Times’s story played a crucial role in investigating and 
punishing governance lapses by those in charge. 
 Media shaming also embarrasses organizations, in addition to 
individuals associated with them, tarnishing their charitable halos.  
Lance Armstrong’s disgraceful fall from hero-athlete to doper cast a 
dark shadow over his immensely popular cancer charity, Livestrong.  A 
front-page newspaper story, published after Armstrong admitted 
doping, accused the organization’s leadership of breaches of loyalty:  
“While Mr. Armstrong’s celebrity fed the charity, the charity also 
enhanced his marketability.  Livestrong also engaged in some deals 
that appeared to have benefited him and his associates, according to 
interviews and financial records.”80  The report alleged that Armstrong 
used the charity as part of his defense to the doping accusations.81  
These claims suggest troubling governance breaches at the charity 
because they imply that the individuals used the charity for personal 
ends and that those in control failed to prevent Armstrong from 
tainting its charitable mission.  Whether or not breaches actually 
occurred, a major newspaper’s allegations are sufficient to inflict 
substantial damage on a charity’s standing in the community and its 
leaders’ reputations.82 
                                                 
 77. See William K. Rashbaum, Wendy Ruderman & Mosi Secret, Fallen Dean’s Life, 
Contradictory to Its Grisly End, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
12/11/nyregion/a-quick-descent-for-cecilia-chang-dean-at-st-johns.html?pagewanted=all&_ 
r=0. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Stephanie Saul, Armstrong’s Business Brand, Bound Tight with His Charity, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/sports/cycling/lance-armstrongs-
business-brand-and-livestrong-are-bound-together.html?pagewanted=all. 
 81. See id. 
 82. The story also mentions that the charity “hired top lawyers with nonprofit 
expertise to make sure its deals were in its best interests and complied with I.R.S. rules.”  See 
id. 
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 Lapses in the duty of care, which requires attention and 
deliberative process in decision making,83 might seem less sensational 
than stealing and other loyalty breaches, but they can also appeal to a 
curious public, which will quickly censure.  The story of Brandeis 
University’s botched attempt to close its Rose Art Museum and sell the 
art to ameliorate its dire financial troubles was featured prominently in 
the press,84 even though the problem was mismanagement rather than 
theft.85  Facing undeniable financial troubles, the Brandeis University 
Board of Trustees voted to close its campus art museum and sell the 
collection without discussing the issue with the museum’s leadership, 
its supporters, or Brandeis’s own fine arts faculty and students.86  The 
Boston Globe immediately picked up the story,87 and the New York 
Times followed soon thereafter with both a news story88 and a scathing 
editorial criticizing the decision.89  Ultimately, the university backed 
down and reversed course, but not before the Massachusetts AG 
commenced an investigation and museum supporters commenced a 
lawsuit.90  Brandeis’s President Jehuda Reinharz resigned two days 
after an internal report on the Rose crisis was issued, though he 
                                                 
 83. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 22, at 201-05. 
 84. See Randy Kennedy & Carol Vogel, Outcry over a Plan To Sell Museum’s 
Holdings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/arts/design/28 
rose.html; Lisa Kocian, Students Rally for Brandeis Museum:  Loss Will Hurt School Stature, 
Protestors Say, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 30, 2009), available at https://a.next.westlaw.com (search 
for “2009 WLNR 1775207”). 
 85. See Linda Sugin, Lifting the Museum’s Burden from the Backs of the University:  
Should the Art Collection Be Treated as Part of the Endowment?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 
566-68 (2010) (arguing that the Rose problem was gross negligence—a problem of lack of 
due care because of the manner in which the university reached the decision and not because 
the substance of the decision was beyond the powers of the university); see also Paul Dillon, 
The Rose Art Museum Crisis, NEW DIRECTION FOR HIGHER EDUC., Fall 2010, at 83 (arguing 
that the incident illustrated the complexities in university decision making and control and 
was exacerbated by Brandeis’s organizational culture). 
 86. See Geoff Edgers, Ailing Brandeis Will Shut Museum, Sell Treasured Art:  No 
Other Choice, Says President, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://a.next.westlaw. 
com (search for “2009 WLNR 1536251”). 
 87. See Geoff Edgers & Peter Schworm, Brandeis To Sell School’s Art Collection, 
BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.boston.com/ae/theater_arts/articles/2009/01/26/ 
brandeis_to_sell_schools_art_collection/. 
 88. See Brandeis Says It Plans To Sell Art Collection To Raise Cash, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/us/27museum.html; Kennedy & Vogel, supra 
note 84. 
 89. “Selling the university’s art collection would help plug its financial gap, but it 
would create a gaping hole in Brandeis’s mission and its reputation.”  Editorial, Art at 
Brandeis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/opinion/02mon4. 
html.  The editorial implied a breach of the duty of obedience.  See id. 
 90. See Sugin, supra note 85, at 543. 
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claimed the decision was not motivated by the Rose fiasco.91  An 
honest and well-meaning director might have gone along with the 
decision on the Rose, in the face of other equally unpleasant solutions. 
 When AGs get involved, they are often followers to the media, as 
was the case in the Brandeis fiasco.  An investigation of improprieties 
at the Getty Trust by the California AG’s office followed an exposé in 
the Los Angeles Times and led to state oversight of the trust for a 
period of years.92  The Boston Globe first revealed financial abuses at 
the Cabot Trust,93 and then the Massachusetts authorities followed up 
and provided for restitution to the charity.94  State authorities cannot be 
blamed for following the press—it is undoubtedly an efficient strategy 
for regulators because they waste little time identifying the problems.95  
But it is nonetheless troubling that the media leads in this way because 
its leadership in overseeing nonprofit organizations reduces the role of 
law and weakens the charitable sector.  There is less need for official 
action when the remedies the law might provide have already been 
meted out or have been rendered moot:  a damning story can destroy 
an organization by drying up donations. 
 The immense power of reputation explains how the media has so 
successfully displaced legal authorities in charities enforcement.  The 
benefits of charity participation are often reputational—your name on 
a building, status in the community, and/or honors and awards from 
local institutions.  These accoutrements of charity leadership are all 
tied to status in the community, and reputational incentives have long 
                                                 
 91. Dillon, supra note 85, at 88. 
 92. See Bill Lockyer, Report on the Office of the Attorney General’s Investigation of 
the J. Paul Getty Trust, CAL. ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_ 
releases/06-085_0a.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (“The Office of the Attorney General’s 
Charitable Trusts Section in July 2005 initiated a civil investigation of the Trust.  The probe 
was launched following a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)).  There was no finding of criminal wrongdoing in the Getty Trust investigation, so 
the investigation solely concerned governance lapses.  See id. at 1 n.1. 
 93. Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 9, 2003), 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2003/10/09/some_officers_of_charities_steer_as
sets_to_selves/?page=full.  Most notoriously, Paul Cabot, the trustee, increased his salary 
from the trust to $1.4 million in one year to cover the cost of his daughter’s wedding.  Id. 
 94. See Sacha Pfeiffer & Michael Rezendes, Mass., 2 Other States To Probe 
Foundations, BOS. GLOBE (Oct 10, 2003), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/ 
articles/2003/10/10/mass_2_other_states_to_probe_foundations/?page=full; Walter V. Robinson 
& Michael Rezendes, Foundation Chief Agrees To Repay over $4M, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 16, 
2004), https://a.next.westlaw.com (search for “2004 WLNR 14185894”). 
 95. States also depend on whistle-blowers and individuals with knowledge of 
improprieties and access to information.  See, e.g., Charitable Organization Complaint Form, 
MASS.GOV, https://www.eform.ago.state.ma.us/ago_eforms/forms/char_ecomplaint.action 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
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functioned as self-monitoring devices for charity leaders.  These 
reputational incentives for good performance are consistent with a 
commitment to the mission.  Almost all trustees volunteer their time 
and expertise,96 suggesting that charities directors generally accept their 
roles out of nonpecuniary dedication to their organizations.  Studies 
show that nonprofit employees accept less compensation, support, and 
infrastructure at their jobs than their for-profit counterparts, signaling 
their mission commitment.97  Reputational incentives for charity 
leaders are aligned with mission commitment because the reputation 
of an organization and its leaders converge.  While reputation is a self-
enforcing mechanism that encourages many individuals to act with 
self-sacrifice for the common good, it is also a tool that the media 
powerfully and purposely wields. 
B. The Good and Bad of Media Enforcement 
 The most compelling arguments in favor of media 
enforcement—and the shaming sanctions that accompany it—are that 
it is effective and cheap.  Media participation in nonprofit oversight 
allows state AGs to devote their scarce resources elsewhere, which 
might produce greater overall benefits for both the sector and society.  
Given the community of upstanding people who generally serve as 
charities fiduciaries, media shaming should be perceived as a serious 
punishment.  Even if the wrongdoer is shameless, so that the 
reputational penalty is ineffective as to him, the collateral effects on 
other charity leaders could justify the approach.  Most charitable 
fiduciaries are respected members of the community and care to 
remain that way, so shaming may be well-targeted to be effective with 
the intended group.  Media enforcement can raise standards of 
governance throughout the sector by spreading fear of humiliation and 
thereby deterring bad behavior. 
 According to Marion Fremont-Smith and Andras Kosaras’s 
compendium of newspaper reports, most cases described in newspaper 
stories on charity wrongdoing also involve a government enforcement 
                                                 
 96. See KURTZ, supra note 21, at 6.  Directors do not work full time for an 
organization.  Nonprofit executives who do work full time receive compensation, which is 
one of the most controversial issues in nonprofit governance today.  See S. 7565, 2012 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (prohibiting salaries for directors of public charities and 
instituting standards for reasonableness of executive compensation). 
 97. See Peter Frumkin & Elizabeth K. Keating, The Price of Doing Good:  Executive 
Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations 8 (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper 
No. 8, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol/papers.cfm?abstract_id=292253 (citing 
studies). 
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party at some point.98  However, there are some cases in which no 
government agencies were involved and the “case” was overseen 
entirely by the press, sometimes with impressive results.  The Dallas 
Morning News reported that the Kimbell Art Foundation overpaid its 
president and vice president.99  Even though there was no government 
action to recover excess benefits, the individuals agreed to forego 
future compensation—an impressive remedy.100  The San Diego Union 
Tribune reported that the executive director of the San Diego Museum 
of Art was alleged to have received excessive compensation, and 
financial controls were implemented at the organization without 
governmental intervention.101  In other cases, the charity took the 
matter into its own hands after press reports, which is also a desirable 
outcome from a good-governance perspective.  For example, in the 
case of the Giving Back Fund, the charity sued the self-dealing director 
and settled the case, and in the case of the Communities Foundation of 
Texas, the charity investigated itself and implemented internal 
controls.102  On the other hand, there are press stories followed by no 
remedial action, such as in the case of the National Foundation for 
AIDS Relief, which also involved allegations of excessive 
compensation reported in the press.103  Thus, not all media enforcement 
produces governance improvement. 
 The press has a long history of monitoring abuses in the 
nonprofit sector, so it is experienced in this role, which is another 
argument in its favor.  Perhaps the most famous nonprofit abuse—the 
United Way scandal involving William Aramony—was exposed by the 
Washington Post in 1992.104  And we might believe that media 
enforcement is more effective today than it was twenty years ago 
                                                 
 98. Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and 
Directors of Charities:  A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25 
(2003), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic (select “Advanced 
Options”; type “Tax Analysts Exempt Organization Tax Review Magazine” into the “Source” 
section; then search for “wrongdoing by officers and directors of charities”; select the first 
result). 
 99. Id. at 54 & n.29. 
 100. Id. at 54. 
 101. Id. at 56 & n.46. 
 102. Id. at 52. 
 103. Id. at 55. 
 104. Charles E. Shepard, Perks, Privileges and Power in a Nonprofit World; Head of 
United Way America Praised, Criticized for Running It Like a Fortune 500 Company, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 16, 1992, available at http://library.tulane.edu/ (search for “perks, privileges and 
power in a nonprofit world”; select “Articles”; follow first “check TULink” hyperlink; follow 
“full text online” hyperlink for Factiva database).  Reports of William Aramony’s behavior 
had been uncovered in “several publications.”  Teltsch, supra note 10. 
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because it is more sustained and focused.  There are a number of 
reputable organizations that hold themselves out as charity watchdogs, 
reporting on the activities and decisions of organizations.105 
 In spite of these reasons to be enthusiastic about media 
enforcement, there are more reasons to be skeptical.  “The majority of 
publishers, editors and reporters contend that the primary role of 
journalism is to expose wrongdoing.”106  This is a problem from the 
perspective of media enforcement of legal obligations for a few 
reasons.  The press may be too zealous in looking for abuses where 
none exist or in identifying something ambiguous as wrongdoing.  The 
press may prove itself too enthusiastic an enforcer, able to indict 
without following through on evidence to convict and to bury 
vindication where few readers tread.107  While the state, because it is 
subject to the rule of law, may not be arbitrary and capricious in its 
legal decisions, the press is not bound by the same standard.  There is 
no required fair process for media accusations or a requirement for 
proportionality.  If the press’s role is to expose wrongdoing, then 
scandals get reported while successes do not.  Even where the press 
gets the facts right—which it often does—this imbalance is 
problematic for the charitable sector because it creates the impression 
of more wrongdoing as a percentage of the whole than is accurate.  
The sector as a whole suffers when the bad is the only story and the 
good is ignored. 
 The media attention to a particular scandal might not reflect the 
seriousness of any legal violations but might instead reflect the public 
interest in a celebrity108 or a well-known institution.  A small scandal 
involving a well-known individual is likely to get more press attention 
than a larger one that is less sensational.  Under the law of some states, 
                                                 
 105. See sources cited supra note 9. 
 106. David Bornstein, Why ‘Solutions Journalism’ Matters, Too, N.Y. TIMES 
OPINIONATOR (Dec. 20, 2011, 8:48 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/ 
20/why-solutions-journalism-matters-too/ (citing DAVID L. PROTESS ET AL., THE JOURNALISM 
OF OUTRAGE:  INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND AGENDA BUILDING IN AMERICA 14 (1991)). 
 107. By the time a determination of no wrongdoing is concluded, the public 
humiliation has already occurred.  If you blinked, or failed to get to page thirteen, you would 
have missed the clearing of General John Allen in the Tampa socialite scandal.  See Thom 
Shanker, Pentagon Clears Commander over E-Mails, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/us/pentagon-clears-general-allen-over-e-mails-with-
socialite.html. 
 108. See Deborah Sontag & Stephanie Strom, Star’s Candidacy in Haiti Puts Focus on 
Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world/americas/ 
17haiti.html (detailing allegations and problems with hip-hop star Wyclef Jean’s 
postearthquake Haiti charity). 
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the legal punishment allowed for care violations can be limited,109 but 
the press may shame regardless of the statute.  The press is in a 
position to embarrass everyone, whether they did something evil, 
clueless, or harmless.  Its enforcement is insensitive to fine legal 
distinctions, meting out a uniform punishment of public 
embarrassment.  Even more than legal authorities, who may have 
trouble with remedies,110 media enforcement cannot tailor remedies to 
suit particular problems. 
 The current crisis in the newspaper business might mean less 
careful enforcement than should be acceptable as a substitute for legal 
action.  Newspapers are traditionally concerned about their own 
reputations, so readers are confident in the reliability of their reporting.  
But the newspaper industry has suffered a severe blow in the last 
decade.111  In their struggle to survive, some newspapers have 
sacrificed in ways that reduce confidence in both their integrity and 
their ability to report accurately.  Hundreds of journalists have been 
fired.  While we cannot blame newspapers for responding to their own 
industry’s pressures, we need to recognize that the changes might make 
them less reliable monitors of fiduciary behavior.  It may be unfair to 
expect that newspapers can afford to carry the burden of law 
enforcement. 
 The ubiquity and permanence of information on the Internet also 
raises concern about the media’s reliability for nonprofit enforcement.  
Not only are there more watchdogs than there were a decade or two 
ago, but their accusations are increasingly easy to find and more 
accessible to more individuals.  It is cheaper to be a media watchdog 
today than it once was, which has led to a proliferation of oversight, 
both reliable and questionable.  Along with the many reputable 
websites run by organizations committed to defined standards, there 
are also individuals who have self-selected as monitors of charity 
                                                 
 109. Organizations can include a provision in their certificate of incorporation limiting 
remedies for breach of care to nonfinancial penalties.  DEL CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014) 
(allowing the inclusion in a certificate of incorporation of a “provision eliminating or limiting 
the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages 
for breach of fiduciary duty as a director”); see also MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31 
(2008) (describing liability standards for directors). 
 110. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 111. See JACK FULLER, WHAT IS HAPPENING TO NEWS:  THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION 
AND THE CRISIS IN JOURNALISM (2010); Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Can Nonprofits Save 
Journalism?:  Legal Constraints and Opportunities, JOAN SHORENSTEIN CENTER ON PRESS, 
POL., PUB. POL’Y (Oct. 2009), http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/can_ 
nonprofits_save_journalism_fremont-smith.pdf. 
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behavior.112  A Google search will reveal their accusations as readily as 
those of more careful institutions.  More troubling is the fact that any 
accusation of misbehavior, whether ultimately proved true or not, is 
permanently in the searchable history of an individual or group.  The 
Internet broadens the range of embarrassment to a wider, more 
geographically dispersed audience.  Every future employer, client, and 
blind date will know that an individual was involved in something 
embarrassing related to a charity.  Reputational taints are more 
permanent today than they were when the daily newspaper was 
discarded at the end of the day, so we should be more careful about 
imposing reputational costs on people. 
 The public may have unrealistically high expectations for charity 
officials.  There is interest in the indiscretions of charities leaders 
because there is a widely held expectation that those who serve 
charities are better than the rest of us.  “Although we have come to 
expect a certain amount of lying, cheating, and stealing in the private 
and public sectors, in the court of public opinion, the nonprofit sector, 
and especially charities, are held to a higher standard.”113  The halo 
effect of charities extends to all who are associated with them, and 
evidence that individuals are lowly humans is sometimes treated as 
scandalous.  In William Aramony’s obituary, readers were reminded 
about his extramarital affair with a girl just out of high school.114  There 
was nothing criminal about the affair in itself—she was not a child—
and yet, it seemed that his position as a major charity leader was 
inconsistent with his sex life.115  He siphoned money from the United 
Way for her, but more broadly for himself, which was the illegal part; 
but reading the obituary, you might think the legal problem involved 
sex rather than money.116  Even donors to charities are more scrutinized 
than others who engage in the same type of behavior.  Consider 
Alberto Vilar, who was convicted of defrauding a client out of $5 
                                                 
 112. Are you familiar with DON’T TELL THE DONOR.ORG, http://donttellthedonor.blog 
spot.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); NONPROFITEER, http://nonprofiteer.net (last visited Mar. 
1, 2015); or NONPROFIT BOARD CRISIS, http://www.nonprofitboardcrisis.typepad.com (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015)?  It is hard to know whom to trust. 
 113. BARBARA KELLERMAN, BAD LEADERSHIP:  WHAT IT IS, HOW IT HAPPENS, WHY IT 
MATTERS 165 (2004). 
 114. See Robert D. McFadden, William Aramony, United Way Leader Who Was Jailed 
for Fraud, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/ 
business/william-aramony-disgraced-leader-of-united-way-dies-at-84.html; William Aramony 
Dead at 84, THE NONPROFIT TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-
articles/william-aramony-dead-at-84/. 
 115. See William Aramony Dead at 84, supra note 114. 
 116. See id. 
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million and sentenced to nine years in jail.117  His crimes have received 
much more attention than similar crimes of others because he was a 
well-known philanthropist and his misappropriations might have been 
connected to gifts he made to the Metropolitan Opera.118 
 Public approbation can arise if there is a suggestion of 
impropriety, even where it is not clear that any legal wrongdoing 
actually occurred.  Some people believe that charity executives should 
accept less compensation than they would have received for similar 
work in the private sector.  The press is perennially interested in 
nonprofit-executive compensation, even when there is no claim of 
impropriety connected to it,119 and charity executives are unable to keep 
their salaries private because IRS Form 990 requires disclosure.120  The 
New York State Board of Regents’ overhaul of Adelphi University’s 
board was partly about its president’s compensation of $837,113 
(including retirement benefits and in-kind perks) in 1995-96.121  That 
was very high at the time for a college president, but was it so high as 
to be an obvious waste of university resources?  The same year, Florida 
State University paid its football coach more than $1 million.122  Many 
of the well-known governance scandals involve compensation and 
perks,123 even though the determination of reasonable compensation 
under the law is difficult and inexact.124  Under federal law, the section 
                                                 
 117. There was a lengthy profile of him in The New Yorker.  See James B. Stewart, 
The Opera Lover; Onward and Upward with the Arts, NEW YORKER (Feb. 13, 2006), 
http://newyorker.com/magazine/2006/02/13/the-opera-lover. 
 118. See Stewart, supra note 117. 
 119. The New York Times reports on college presidents annually.  See, e.g., Tamar 
Lewin, Three Dozen Private-College Presidents Earned over $1 Million in 2010, Study Finds, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/education/three-dozen-
private-college-presidents-earned-over-1-million-in-2010.html; Tamar Lewin, Private-College 
Presidents Getting Higher Salaries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/12/05/education/increase-in-pay-for-presidents-at-private-colleges.html. 
 120. See Form 990, supra note 62, at 7-8 (requiring information about the compensa-
tion of officers, directors, trustees, key employees, and the five highest compensated 
employees).  This is much more disclosure than is required of business organizations.  See 
Form 10-K, supra note 62. 
 121. See Meyer, supra note 20. 
 122. Bobby Bowden was the first college coach to break the $1 million mark, but now 
that is common.  See Michael Sanserino, College Coaches’ Salaries Continue To Soar, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 15, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/ 
nation/2011/01/15/College-coaches-salaries-continue-to-soar/stories/201101150179. 
 123. For example, Barry Munitz, of the Getty Trust, enjoyed excessive perks but did 
not siphon funds from the charity.  See Lockyer, supra note 92, at 2-3. 
 124. For a good discussion of reasonable compensation and I.R.C. § 4958 (2012), see 
Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders:  Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 735 (2007). 
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4958 regulations125 take an arm’s-length comparative approach to 
compensation, expressly allowing comparison with for-profit 
compensation for similar jobs,126 even though that might appear 
excessive to people who are committed to lower relative salaries in the 
nonprofit sector.127  The standard for excessive compensation in the 
federal tax regulations does not always coincide with the expectations 
that people have about what is a fair pay package for nonprofit 
executives, and compensation has increased even after the adoption of 
the federal rules.128  Public outrage over salaries is not always rational 
or justified. 
 The media operates with little check on its judgment because 
there are no “norm entrepreneurs”129 in nonprofit governance who use 
the media but are more reliable watchdogs than the journalists 
themselves.  I am thinking of the model of Robert Monks and Nell 
Minow, who have been effective in fostering improved corporate 
governance by publicizing inadequate behavior in the media.  Monks 
and Minow are in the business of advising shareholders for 
institutional investors.  On one occasion, they placed a full page ad in 
the Wall Street Journal accusing the directors of the Sears Corporation 
of being “non-performing assets,” and within a short time, the 
directors changed their behavior.130  Monks and Minow are effective 
nongovernmental watchdogs due to a combination of factors that are 
mostly inapposite in the nonprofit context.  First, their clients (and 
consequently their business) stand to gain or lose on account of their 
                                                 
 125. I.R.C. § 4958 imposes an excise tax on excess benefit transactions, which include 
excessive compensation of individuals in positions of control in the organization. 
 126. The rebuttable presumption of reasonableness in Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2) 
(2012) requires that the organization use appropriate comparability data for compensation.  
The regulation states, “In the case of compensation, relevant information includes, but is not 
limited to, compensation levels paid by similarly situated organizations, both taxable and tax-
exempt, for functionally comparable positions . . . .”  Id. 
 127. A proposed New York law takes a narrower approach: 
Compensation exchanged by a not-for-profit corporation for the performance of services by 
an executive must not be excessive and the governing body (i.e., the board of directors, board 
of trustees, or equivalent controlling body) shall consider factors including, but not limited to:  
compensation levels paid by similarly situated not-for-profit corporations as defined in 
section one hundred two of this chapter; the availability of similar services in the geographic 
area of the applicable provider of services; current compensation surveys compiled by 
independent firms; and actual written offers from similar institutions competing for the 
services of the applicable executive. 
S. 7565, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (proposing to add section 727 to the 
New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, although this was not adopted). 
 128. See Manny, supra note 124, at 735-37. 
 129. See Skeel, supra note 56, at 1859. 
 130. See id. at 1826, 1846, 1848. 
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actions, so they have capital and goodwill at stake when they accuse 
boards of bad performance.  Their successes in corporate governance 
reforms translate into profits for their clients and for themselves.  
Second, their actions come at significant cost to themselves—their 
Sears board ad cost over $100,000.131  Third, they have credibility on 
account of their experience and their personal investment in the cause; 
Monks was once a bank president, and he has used his personal 
resources to fund his ventures.132  Without established norm 
entrepreneurs with stakes in the outcome of nonprofit governance, the 
arbiters of reputation for nonprofit actors are the media itself, who lack 
the incentives and constraints that norm entrepreneurs face. 
 Media oversight might not be as effective in deterring bad 
behavior as one might hope, and too much media attention to 
nonprofit abuses may backfire and reduce overall social welfare.  In 
the criminal context, scholars have argued that too much shaming can 
reduce public interest in the bad behavior and consequently fail to 
produce the intended deterrence; the public may become accustomed 
to the negative publicity and stop noticing it.133  That would be a 
problem in the charitable context as well, undermining the 
effectiveness of media oversight without governance improvements.  
The opposite effect from media overload is also troubling in the 
charitable context:  too many stories of charity abuse can undermine 
the public’s trust in the charitable sector as a whole and the public’s 
commitment to support it. 
 Sometimes bad leaders bring fundamentally good organizations 
down with them, an unfortunate by-product of public shaming of 
fiduciaries.  Charitable institutions are more vulnerable to the effects 
of public ignominy than are for-profit corporations because the loss of 
donations can have an immediate, devastating effect on charitable 
services; charitable donors are not equivalent to washing machine 
purchasers, who may buy a good product even if it is produced by a 
company with bad governance.134  Hale House, one of the “most 
                                                 
 131. See id. at 1826 n.56. 
 132. See id. at 1859. 
 133. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1880, 1930-31 (1991). 
 134. The stock price may reflect bad press, but the price of the stock in the market may 
not have any immediate effect on the underlying operations of the business.  Charitable 
organizations with large endowments may weather volatility in donations better than others, 
but many organizations have no endowment on which to rely. 
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famous charities in the world” in 1985,135  never fully recovered from 
its 2001 scandal, which involved the theft of millions of dollars by the 
organization’s president (and founder’s daughter).136  While it is 
impossible to know whether the organization could have recovered 
from the abuses if it had sufficient funds, the donating public did not 
give it that chance.  Hale House continues to exist today, but it is a 
shadow of its former self.  Business shaming strategies may encourage 
better corporate governance,137 but charity shaming strategies are 
unlikely to produce net benefits to the charitable sector because the 
immediate deleterious effect on donations is likely to be more harmful 
than the long-term salutary effects on governance improvements. 
 There has been a lively debate in the criminal law literature about 
shaming as a criminal sanction.  While media shaming of nonprofits is 
not quite analogous, the criminal law debate may shed some light on 
the general desirability of a shaming strategy.  Proponents of shaming 
argue that it is an effective and efficient alternative to other criminal 
penalties, and opponents argue that shaming disrespects individuals 
and is not ultimately successful as a deterrent.138  As we consider the 
remedy of public embarrassment for negligent charity governance, it is 
helpful to note that the weight of opinion in that literature seems to 
have turned decidedly against shaming, with Dan Kahan, an early 
champion,139 explicitly recanting.140  The reasons are many, but those 
who are willing to countenance shaming in the criminal context are 
dubious about the conditions under which it would take place in our 
society.141  We generally operate in a community that is too big for 
effective shaming sanctions, which demand reintegration after 
shaming.  Misgivings among criminal law scholars should make 
                                                 
 135. Kathryn Jean Lopez, Scandal at Hale House:  Sifting Through the Rubble of a 
Once-Proud Nonprofit, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE (Aug./Sept. 2001), http://www. 
philanthropyroundtable.org/topic/excellence_in_philanthropy/scandal_at_hale_house. 
 136. See Heidi Evans, Hale House Shuts Doors to Orphans, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 8, 
2008, 6:58 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/hale-house-shuts-doors-orphans-
article-1.303533; Lopez, supra note 135.  In 2008, Hale House substantially scaled back its 
program, still suffering from reduced funds.  See Evans, supra. 
 137. See Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 959 (1999) (arguing that corporate directors should be required to be present at 
the criminal sentencing of the corporation). 
 138. See Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime:  Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming 
Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186 (2003). 
 139. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591 (1996). 
 140. See Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 2075 (2006). 
 141. See Massaro, supra note 133, at 1917-35. 
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charities officials wary about embracing reputational sanctions to 
foster better nonprofit governance. 
 In addition, there are important distinctions between criminal law 
shaming and enforcing fiduciary duties through public embarrassment 
that make the strategy even less attractive in the latter context.  First, 
the criminal law literature evaluates shaming as opposed to 
incarceration,142 while incarceration is not the model in fiduciary duty 
enforcement.  In governance, the alternative is some greater 
governmental participation along a wide spectrum of enforcement that 
might include regulation, disclosure, liability, and/or advisory 
procedures like the ones advocated here.  Rehabilitation in this context 
is about fostering good decision-making practices, and as long as there 
are alternatives to shaming that might achieve that goal better than 
public humiliation, they should be pursued.  Second, the criminal law 
literature assumed that shaming would be imposed by a governmental 
institution so that a court might require a convicted drunk driver to 
publicize that fact in a bumper sticker or the state might publish a list 
of the clients of prostitutes.143  Reputational punishments for 
inadequate charity governance meted out by the press are wholly 
outside the law.  For all these reasons, enforcement by humiliation is 
bad policy that undermines the rule of law, even if it is effective in 
improving charity governance. 
 If we are dissatisfied with the role of the press and believe that 
the corporate model of self-enforcement ill suits nonprofits, greater 
government involvement by the state will be necessary.  Media 
attention is unlikely to wane, and increased media regulation is 
unlikely to be desirable or pass muster under the First Amendment.  
The government needs to do more to reset the balance.  States must 
make and develop law, something the media is institutionally unable to 
do.  They also need to be the neutral arbiter of good charity 
governance, applying the law in an evenhanded and accountable way, 
without concern for celebrity and sensationalism, a neutrality that the 
media cannot guarantee. 
 Charity officials have lost ground, and that is troubling because 
state charity bureaus, unlike the journalists and bloggers, are 
concerned with the legal standards and with protecting the charitable 
sector and its resources.  The primary reason why states should 
                                                 
 142. See Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions:  Reflections 
on the Future of Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2007). 
 143. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:  A 
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 367 (1999). 
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respond to the challenge of private enforcers is because there is no 
guarantee that the private enforcers care to, or are in a position to, 
maximize public benefit.  State AGs cannot be passive observers of 
media enforcement; if the state chooses to underenforce fiduciary 
obligations, it is choosing to allow private parties to manage that 
enforcement instead.  The increasing power and influence of media 
enforcers need to be countered with greater activity by state AGs.  We 
must recognize that the problem is not only that bad things are 
happening without legal consequences, but that legal institutions are 
failing to prevent those things from happening before they do.  Given 
media attention, the confidentiality paradox, and the scarcity of legal 
guidance, states should consider shifting some of their focus to better 
facilitating good governance. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR ADVANCE RULINGS 
 Charity governance needs more focused attention and more 
expert decision making by nonprofit fiduciaries.  Unfortunately, 
current institutions are not designed to promote these objectives.  Too 
much attention has been focused on ex post enforcement after 
wrongdoing has occurred, rather than ex ante intervention to prevent 
wrongdoing.  The tools used by AGs and courts are not designed to 
raise the quality of governance decisions because they are backward-
looking:  both state regulators and courts exercise their power to order 
financial restitution—an appropriate remedy in cases of loyalty 
breaches—but this is rarely a cure for the problems of insufficient care 
or obedience.144  Financial restitution is only apt where a fiduciary 
breach is clearly connected to a past loss of charitable funds.  The 
remedy in the Sibley Hospital case—a judicially imposed education 
for directors in their governance obligations145—attempted to address 
the source of the problem identified by the court.  The remedy did not 
actually cure the failure to exercise care that had previously taken 
place, but it did hone in on the nature of the breach.  At the same time, 
the remedy was weak as an enforcement sanction.  So, even though it 
was designed to suit the problem, it seems insufficient in the ex post 
context. 
 There are substantial roadblocks to increasing ex post 
enforcement of fiduciary duties.  Resources are a primary one.  The 
                                                 
 144. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & 
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1021 (D.D.C. 1974). 
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perennial problem of scarce state enforcement resources has 
understandably beggared charitable governance; many AGs focus their 
limited attention on the problems of fraud, leaving governance for the 
sector to manage.146  But the best use of scarce public resources needs 
to be evaluated more broadly, considering the context of the social 
benefits of the charitable sector as a whole.  It is a mistake to focus 
solely on the budgetary costs to state AG offices in determining 
whether it is worthwhile to invest in charity governance.  The larger 
social costs of poor governance need to be factored in as well.  
Solutions should value overall efficiencies so that the costs to charities, 
as well as to government, are considered.  These charity costs include 
the difficulty of attracting good directors, litigation costs incurred 
whether governance practices are vindicated or not, and public faith in 
the integrity of the sector.  States and individual organizations should 
both be willing to make investments that can prevent greater public 
and charity costs in the future. 
 Increasing disclosure has been one strategy.147  Although 
disclosure might generate greater enforcement opportunities, state 
resources have not enabled AGs to mine the disclosures the way they 
might.  States could capitalize on disclosure by allowing others to 
bring enforcement actions; nonprofits could mimic the shareholder 
derivative action.  Similarly, states could promote judicial enforcement 
of trustee fiduciary obligations by expanding the rules for standing to 
donors (and others) and thereby allow private parties to assist the state 
in enforcement.  Though some scholars have advocated broader 
standing rules,148 more plaintiffs would mean more harassment and 
expense for nonprofit organizations, with questionable governance 
benefits to offset those costs. 
 Another option to increase enforcement would be to pare back 
the “best judgment rule,” which protects the exercise of judgment by 
trustees who act in good faith and without conflicts of interest.149  But it 
                                                 
 146. Judging from their websites, many states focus their attention specifically on 
solicitation fraud.  About Charities, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/2382.htm (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2015); Charities, MICH. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-
164-17337-18095---,00.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 147. See Brody, supra note 60; Reiser, supra note 60. 
 148. See, e.g., Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing To Enforce Charitable Gifts:  Civil 
Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1101 (2005) (“[D]onors whose 
restricted gifts are crucial to the vitality and diversity of the charitable sector should have 
standing to enforce those gifts . . . .”). 
 149. The “best judgment rule” is the nonprofit corporation corollary of the business 
judgment rule for business corporations.  It empowers directors to make bad decisions 
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would be unwise to abrogate the best judgment rule because it strikes 
an important balance in the law.  The rule is essential in the nonprofit 
sector to enable organizations to attract directors and, more 
importantly, to maintain the private character of charity governance.150  
Judicial micromanagement of charity governance is unlikely to 
produce net benefits for the charitable sector, and any judicial solution 
could require changing core elements of nonprofit law.  A less 
dramatic solution to governance lapses would be preferable. 
 Creative, forward-looking action better fits the problems 
connected with care and obedience (and even sometimes loyalty) than 
any kind of after-the-fact enforcement.  Even though it is 
underdeveloped in legal precedent and underenforced by state 
authorities, lawyers advising charities believe that the duty of care is 
authentic and that the minimum standard of charity oversight requires 
fiduciaries to pay attention and gather information.151  Charities need to 
hew to their mission, even though there is little particular guidance that 
teaches them how.152 
 We need to focus on the goals of greater enforcement for 
fiduciary duties.  Care technically requires process,153 but that process 
is always a proxy for improved substance.  Care demands deliberation 
and information gathering in the hope that the substantive decisions 
that boards reach are better.154  But process is not always a good 
substitute for a correct answer on the merits, and some studies indicate 
that imposing some forms of “good” process do not necessarily 
improve substantive outcomes.155 
 For these reasons, I propose a formal advance-ruling procedure 
under which state AGs provide advice to nonprofit fiduciaries on 
                                                                                                             
without being second-guessed by courts.  See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 36, at 152-
53. 
 150. See generally Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, How Public Is Private Philanthropy?:  
Separating Reality from Myth, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE (2012), http://www.philanthropy 
roundtable.org/file_uploads/How_Public_Is_Private_Philanthropy.pdf. 
 151. See Goldschmid, supra note 75, at 632 (describing law as “aspirational”). 
 152. See Sugin, supra note 7, at 925-27. 
 153. “The members of the board of directors . . . , when becoming informed in 
connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight 
function, must discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would 
reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”  MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 
§ 8.30(b) (2008). 
 154. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 22, at 201-05. 
 155. For example, independent boards might not produce better governance.  See 
Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance? (Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
1002421, 2007) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1002421. 
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specific fiduciary decisions.  Such a process would be particularly 
valuable for care questions, because—as I have argued—there is no 
adequate way to repair care after a breach.  An advance-ruling process 
could also extend to loyalty156 and obedience questions; the dilemmas 
posed in the introduction to this Article raise all three kinds of issues.  
Advance rulings could be a more effective and efficient use of state 
resources than other approaches to improved enforcement, like 
disclosure and broader standing rules.  Recall that a central problem 
with fiduciary duties of nonprofit directors is that there is so little legal 
authority on even the most fundamental issues that nonprofit 
fiduciaries regularly find themselves facing.157  There are too many 
questions for which there are no definitive answers, and the states 
should try to fill that gap by issuing guidance that fiduciaries—and 
their lawyers—can use to guide their behavior. 
 The ruling process could resemble the private letter ruling 
process at the IRS.158  A charity would have to follow procedures 
determined by the state and have a question that the AG is willing to 
rule on.  The ruling request would need to set out both the legal 
questions presented and the facts to which the law should be applied.159  
In the tax context, the question is often:  will this transaction be 
taxable?  In the charities context, the question will often be:  will these 
actions satisfy the board’s fiduciary obligations?  While the AG might 
be able to answer with a short yes or no, even a minimal application of 
the law to the facts would be helpful to other boards with similar 
problems.  In selected cases, the AG might choose to write a longer 
“opinion” analyzing an important question of law. 
 Like private letter rulings, these advance rulings would not have 
precedential effect or become binding on the state in other cases, but 
they would provide guidance to the charity requesting the letter160 and 
establish a body of decisions that advisors could use in understanding 
the contours of charity fiduciary law.  After some time, for example, 
                                                 
 156. Loyalty questions often turn into process questions because the statutory safe 
harbor provisions that apply to conflict-of-interest transactions consist of cleansing processes.  
See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (2014).  I am grateful to Caroline Gentile for this 
point. 
 157. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 158. See Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. 1-91.  The provision of advice by regulators 
is not unique to the IRS.  The Securities and Exchange Commission also provides advice—
even answering questions by telephone.  See Manual of Publicly Available Telephone 
Interpretations, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml (last modified Feb. 2, 
2007). 
 159. See Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. at 18-30. 
 160. See id. at 50-53. 
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we would get a sense of what constitutes adequate, minimum 
participation necessary for a board member to satisfy her duties and 
the kinds of deliberations and disclosures that would satisfy the 
statutory procedures for review of conflict transactions161 (as well as 
the nature of the conflicts transactions that are acceptable).  Because 
fiduciary duties are broad, general guidance (even if not binding on the 
government) is helpful. 
 As a first step toward building a useful body of law, I would 
challenge state AGs to redact and publish the settlements they have 
entered into that have been kept secret.  There may currently be a large 
body of guidance that charities could use if it were made available to 
them.  State AGs could follow the IRS ruling model of confidentiality 
by protecting the identity of an organization but disclosing its issues.  
In the versions publicly available under the Freedom of Information 
Act (and regularly published), IRS letters provide sufficient facts for 
subsequent actors to measure their similarity to the requesting party, 
but not so much that applicants are outed in the process. 
 My proposal for an advance-ruling process takes advantage of 
some of the unique characteristics of charities.  While there is 
admittedly deliberate wrongdoing in the charitable sector, public 
policies should capitalize on the general perception that charitable 
fiduciaries are devoted to the missions of their organizations and 
volunteer to participate as a way to do good in the community.  My 
proposal builds on their good intentions and honest efforts, while 
recognizing that there is a limit to their time, attention, and good 
judgment.  Will Rogers is claimed to have said, “Good judgment 
comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.”162  
The problem for fiduciaries is that there is no room for the bad 
judgment to come first, so good judgment needs to come from 
something other than experience.  The queasy feeling that a lawyer 
may have when presented with a transaction between an organization 
and one of its directors may not raise any red flags for a well-meaning 
fellow director who is ignorant of the law and busy with other 
concerns. 
 The specter of public embarrassment that nonprofit fiduciaries 
face when they err is likely to be sufficient to encourage them to take 
extra steps to avoid mistakes—as long as the cost of avoidance is not 
too high.  The risk of making a bad mistake might be small, the risk of 
                                                 
 161. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2008). 
 162. Will Rogers Legacy:  Remembering That Old Cowboy, CA.GOV, http://www. 
parks.ca.gov/?page_id=23998 (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
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being found out is even smaller, and the risk of being legally 
sanctioned is virtually nonexistent, but the risk of being embarrassed 
in the community could be substantial.  Trustees can be expected to 
make a cost-benefit analysis of any ex ante mechanisms that can 
prevent future missteps. 
 The New York AG is on the right track with its new Directors U 
initiative, which offers instruction in good governance to nonprofit 
directors.163  Some states include guidelines for good practices on their 
websites, but visits to the AG websites of all fifty states have revealed 
how little is available to guide the well-meaning but confused charity 
fiduciary.164  Many states are more focused on fundraising and the 
important issues of solicitation fraud and donor protection than on 
charity governance, per se.  Training charitable fiduciaries to 
understand their obligations and preparing them to manage problems 
they might face could greatly improve the quality of charity 
governance.165  However, I am skeptical about how many individuals 
will volunteer to undergo training if they are not legally required to do 
so under a statute.166  Board meetings and charity functions are already 
an imposition on the time of volunteer board members who have jobs, 
families, and other obligations.  People do not necessarily recognize 
that they could use training until they have a problem they cannot 
solve, and, even then, they are likely to be more concerned with a 
specific solution to that problem than with general standards of 
behavior that might not shed light on the particular case. 
 An advance-ruling process makes financial sense for both states 
and charities.  An important feature of tax private letter rulings are the 
                                                 
 163. See A.G. Schneiderman Announces Bold Plan To Revitalize and Reform New 
York’s Nonprofit Sector, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-
release/ag-schneiderman-announces-bold-plan-revitalize-and-reform-new-yorks-nonprofit-
sector. 
 164. Visits to the AG websites of all fifty states revealed that some sites were not 
searchable (Alabama, Idaho, and Wyoming) and others had no information on charities (e.g., 
Mississippi, Nebraska, and West Virginia).  The vast majority had very little information for 
charities and were primarily directed toward donor protection.  Only a few states had a 
substantial amount of helpful information for charity fiduciaries (California, Massachusetts, 
and New York).  Research compilation of state AG websites is on file with author. 
 165. New York is way ahead of the pack in offering both training and attorney-
matching services to nonprofits.  This is an initiative with the New York City Bar Association.  
See City Bar Justice Center’s Public Service Network Places 1,000th Volunteer, N.Y.C. BAR 
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://www2.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/news-a-media/press-releases/ 
122-city-bar-justice-centers-public-service-network-places-1000th-volunteer-lawyer. 
 166. S. 7565, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (proposing the addition of 
section 116 to the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law), provides that nonprofit 
corporations contracting with the state may attend state consortium training free of charge, 
but does not require them to do so. 
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fees that requesting parties must pay.167  For strapped charities bureaus, 
fees paid by requesting parties can finance all or part of the project.  
The IRS charges more for more complex rulings and reduces fees for 
small taxpayers; charities bureaus could follow the same pattern and 
have sliding fees based on resources and complexity.  It would often be 
in the best interest of a charity to pay a modest fee and request AG 
advice because a ruling would not only foreclose state enforcement 
vis-à-vis the requesting charity, but would also protect that 
organization from private litigation on the issue, a real advantage for 
the organization.  The IRS requires that requesting parties draft what is 
essentially a legal brief and submit it as part of the ruling request.  This 
reduces costs for the government in researching the issue and 
identifying relevant authority, and the model is attractive in this context 
also.  Depending on the issue, some types of charity requests might be 
prepared without the assistance of a lawyer; the charities bureau could 
design a model form for certain types of ruling requests that 
moderately competent directors could complete.  One example might 
be a series of questions related to satisfaction of the safe harbor for 
independent review of conflict-of-interest transactions.  It could 
inquire as to the nature of the conflict disclosed, the nature of the 
transaction, and the process undertaken by the organization to 
determine the transaction’s fairness.168 
 Early intervention by the AG can prevent later needs for 
enforcement, so the total commitment of resources by the state might 
not be so much higher than it is today.  Consider the example of the 
Rose Art Museum again.  The university’s unilateral announcement 
was followed quickly by litigation that continued despite intervention 
by the state.  The Massachusetts AG was involved in the resolution of 
the problem but was too late to prevent the incident from becoming a 
fiasco for Brandeis and its president.  The matter was not finally 
closed until the private litigation settled quite a while later.169  Earlier 
involvement by the AG that forestalls private actions would benefit 
charities like Brandeis by reducing the costs of potential missteps.  The 
resources that go into disputes with private parties are a precious loss 
to the charitable sector, often with no offsetting benefit.  Even where 
                                                 
 167. See I.R.C. § 7528 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. 55-61, 68-72; Rev. 
Proc. 2012-8, 2012-1 I.R.B. 235. 
 168. Different states have different statutes for cleansing conflicted transactions, but 
these are the common elements.  See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (2014). 
 169. Brandeis announced the settlement with the plaintiffs and the termination of the 
AG’s investigation on June 30, 2011.  See Brandeis, Plaintiffs Settle Rose Art Museum 
Lawsuit, BRANDEIS NOW (June 30, 2011), http://www.brandeis.edu/now/2011/june/rose.html. 
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challengers are denied standing to challenge the charity’s actions,170 
defending the action is a drain of charitable resources.  It would be 
worth extra investment in the charities bureaus to prevent the massive 
expenses incurred in litigation. 
 This proposal is not designed to foil purposeful wrongdoers.  Nor 
would it help to solve the problem of completely clueless charity 
fiduciaries.  Accordingly, an advance-ruling process would not 
preempt the need for all state enforcement of fiduciary obligations.  
Instead, the process is intended for well-meaning, busy, and somewhat 
ignorant directors—which is likely to be the vast majority.  They need 
to know that they can turn to the AG for guidance, but they do not need 
to know much about the substance of their obligations before they do.  
This is an important advantage of the proposal because it is often 
easier to recognize that you have a problem than it is to determine the 
solution.  Requesting a ruling on a unique question seems more 
realistic than expecting charity fiduciaries to suddenly embrace their 
legal responsibilities with sustained attention and enthusiasm. 
 In the aggregate, an advance-ruling process has the potential to 
improve nonprofit governance throughout the sector by creating more 
law.  Because the AG will be guiding the contours, the proposal allows 
the states to reclaim control over fiduciary duty law.  While there will 
likely be a high demand for rulings at first, as more guidance becomes 
available, the need for further rulings should decline, reducing the cost 
to both charities and government.  The goal of the system is to create a 
body of law robust and varied enough that individual charities will not, 
in fact, need to request their own rulings unless they have unique 
issues. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 We are in an unfortunate bind in the world of charity law.  If an 
organization resolves an issue with the AG’s office, the entire 
procedure is likely to stay confidential.  That is good for the 
organization involved because it suffers none of the reputational harm 
that public disclosure—and embarrassing press—brings.  But for the 
                                                 
 170. A surprising number of published opinions conclude that plaintiffs lack standing 
to sue.  See Wisdom v. Centerville Fire Dist., Inc., 391 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2010); Kidwell 
ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Askew v. Trs. of the Gen. Assembly 
of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D. 
Pa. 2009); George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); 
O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398 (Md. 1994); Grand Council of Ohio v. Owens, 620 
N.E.2d 234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Lundberg v. Lascelles, No. 59178-9-I, 2007 WL 4157779 
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2007). 
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charitable community as a whole, that resolution is mixed.  It is good 
that organizations reform their activities to better carry out the goals of 
the charitable sector.  But it is unfortunate that there is so little 
application of the law for charities to look to in measuring their own 
compliance. 
 I know that the popular mantra both in and out of the nonprofit 
world is transparency.  But transparency is sometimes overrated.  
Disclosure is desirable when it encourages individuals to comply with 
the liability standards of the law and boosts a higher aspirational 
standard of behavior.171  Transparency is not helpful where daylight 
threatens the mission and public support for organizations 
experiencing governance challenges.  The public interest is served 
when state regulators intervene as a problem develops at an 
organization and design solutions with the organization that prevent 
debacles. 
 Once the media has reported a problem, a constructive remedy is 
unlikely.  The shaming effects on individuals and organizations 
involved are already part of the permanent and easily accessed record.  
The only solution that really addresses the problem of media shaming 
that protects charities and prevents mistakes made by fiduciaries is one 
that precedes widespread publicity.  The AG’s office needs to be 
involved earlier, and its role needs to be more advisory and less 
enforcing.  While some charities officials already see their role this 
way, it is important to institutionalize and endorse that role. 
 In the business context, we may be less worried about dumb 
decisions because we are confident that the market will eventually 
correct them.  In the charity context, we should be more concerned 
about any interim waste of charitable resources, along with the fact 
that there is no ultimate market correction for governance missteps.  
While AGs should not act as super-trustees of nonprofit organizations, 
charities bureaus are in the business of maximizing benefits for the 
charitable sector.  They know about conserving charitable assets, and 
they work within the framework of the law and its norms of fairness. 
 For the protection of the sector as a whole and its reputation for 
doing good, we need a procedure that minimizes both real mistakes 
and opportunities for public embarrassment that do not translate into 
public benefits.  Any enforcement that punishes following a breach is 
                                                 
 171. The questions about governance on Form 990 might signal the aspirational 
standard.  The sector itself can also offer such standards.  See Strengthening Transparency 
Governance Accountability of Charitable Organizations, PANEL ON NONPROFIT SECTOR 90-91 
(June 2005), http://www.neh.gov/files/divisions/fedstate/panel_final_report.pdf. 
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inferior to a mechanism that can prevent such a breach.  The 
administration of the law needs to be more proactive because the 
media is likely to become more powerful, more ubiquitous, and more 
decentralized.  Greater government participation is necessary to 
recalibrate the balance between private punishments and public law. 
